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anti-marriage arguments directed to women. In both cases, his rhetoric against
the opposite sex bolsters his campaign to win as many Christians as possible for
the ascetic life--a life that is lived outside texts. Marriage is the lowly
"thirtyfold harvest" (compared with the glorious "onehundredfold harvest" of
widowhood) that Christians of both sexes would do well to eschew.'
The patristic writings, in other words, not only concern life outside
texts, they are written to influence it. Their aim--and here we can speak.
confidently about authorial intention--is manifest: to keep women from the
priesthood and from public activity in general, to reinforce the subordination
of wives to husbands, and to lure as many Christians as possible to the
renunciation of marriage and reproduction. Whatever "entertainment" the
patristic authors provide for educated readers through their skillful
incorporation of classical allusions, ringing rhetoric, and witticisms, their
purpose is severely didactic in a way that the literature cited by Bloch is not -and didacticism, to be sure, aims at a world that exists outside texts. By
blurring the different texts of patristic literature, by claiming misogyny as a
constant that cannot be well historicized, Bloch contributes to the very
generalizing and essentializing of woman that he repudiates intellectually. The
factors that prompted the different constellation of anti-female and antimarriage sentiments in medieval texts, as compared with patristic ones, are
glossed over, to the detriment of a more historically nuanced reading.
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Howard Bloch's essay argues convincingly that the instability and
garrulousness attributed to women in misogynistic discourse is also an attribute
of the very texts that execrate these "feminine" characteristics. But Bloch also
suggests that these writings are fmally concerned less with women than with
rhetoric, that medieval misogyny is a hermeneutical rather than a political
issue. To be sure, Bloch acknowledges "the very real disenfranchisement of
women in the Middle Ages" (8); he even devotes a paragraph of his essay to a
list of some examples of medieval sexism. Having made that gesture to social
history, however, he questi ons the validity of connecting antifeminist discourse
with the material conditions of women. [These material recriminations] "...are
not the same as misogyny, and one has to be careful not to move too easily
between the domain of institutions and the discourse of antifeminism"(9).
Rather than risk a too easy movement between the two domains, Bloch then

3Jerome's famous exegesis of the parable of the sower (Mk. 4:3-9=Mt. 13: 1-9=Lk. 8: 48), found in his Adversus Jovinianum 1,3, and Epp. 22, 15; 48 (49), 2; 66,2; 123,9.
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decides to dismiss social history. Nonetheless, in a footnote arguing the
distinction between the world and the text, Bloch leaves open a line of inquiry
for feminists to pursue: "Leaving aside the unknowable affective element of
woman-hating, misogyny is a way of speakin g about women as distinct from
doing something to women, though speaking may be a form of doing and even
of social practice, or at least its ideological component" (22 n.15). That
acknowledgment of a possible connection between ideology and social practice
remains as one of the seams after Bloch's excision of social history.
I would like to construct a rather different interpretation of medieval
misogyny, using as a point of departure the material circumstances that Bloch
dismisses. Among the gender-differentiated legal and social practices he
enumerates, a number serve to restrict women's access to public discourse and
hence to the power inherent in the institutions of court and church.
Antifeminist literature helps support those repressive practices, for in
presenting woman as an unreliable user of language it helps to justify the legal
and social mechanisms which silence her. Thus Andreas Capellanus' charge
that woman is "a slanderer of other women," "fickle in her speech," "a liar," "a
babbler, no keeper of secrets," and "loud-mouthed" (quoted in Bloch18) is not
devoid of material consequences. Supplementing the negative and distasteful
discourse of medieval misogyny are the literary portraits of exemplary women
found in romance and hagiography. Those contrasting images remind us of
Foucault's insistance that power operates as much in its capacity to incite desire
as to repress it.
But what are feminists to make of the anxiety about writing that Bloch
detects in the discourse of misogynists? Again, an appeal to material
circumstances may be more helpful than Bloch allows. The act of writing
inevitably cuts off a writer from his words; his physical presence no longer
serves as a guarantee for their authenticity. If woman "as secondary,
derivative, supervenient, and supplemental, assumes all that is inferior,
debased, scandalous, and perverse" (0), she makes possible the Being, Truth ,
and Unity of the author and the text. In occupying the secondary position,
woman shores up man's ascendant position in patriarchy and guarantees the
validity of his discourse. But since that gender polarity is rather a cultural
construct than a biological necessity, it is inherently unstable. Like other
binary oppositions (logic vs. rhetoric, form vs. matter), it refuses to remain
fixed. Thus the theologian or the philosopher who attempts to convey truth in
language cannot purify his discourse of rhetoric. He must constantly confront
the "perverse secondariness" of language. In order to ensure the authority of
his own enterprise and to have access to the power he has vested in language, he
must project that perversity onto women.
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